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Overhead (time and energy) management is paramount for IoT edge devices
considering their typically resource-constrained nature. In this thesis we present
two contributions for lowering resource consumption of IoT devices. The first
contribution is minimizing the overhead of the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
authentication protocol in the context of IoT networks by selecting a lightweight
cipher suite configuration. TLS is the de facto authentication protocol for secure
communication in Internet of Things (IoT) applications. However, the processing
and energy demands of this protocol are the two essential parameters that must be
taken into account with respect to the resource-constraint nature of IoT devices.
For the first contribution, we study these parameters using a testbed in which
an IoT board (Cypress CYW43907) communicates with a server over an 802.11
wireless link. Although TLS supports a wide-array of cipher suites, in this paper
we focus on DHE RSA, ECDHE RSA, and ECDHE ECDSA, which are among the
most popular ciphers used due to their robustness. Our studies show that ciphers
using Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDHE) key exchange are considerably more
efficient than ciphers using Diffie Hellman (DHE). Furthermore, ECDSA signature
verification consumes more time and energy than RSA signature verification for
ECDHE key exchange. This study helps IoT designers choose an appropriate TLS
cipher suite based on application demands, computational capabilities, and energy
resources available.
The second contribution of this thesis is deploying supervised machine learn-
ing anomaly detection algorithms on an IoT edge device to reduce data trans-
mission overhead and cloud storage requirements. With continuous monitoring
and sensing, millions of Internet of Things sensors all over the world generate
tremendous amounts of data every minute. As a result, recent studies start to
raise the question as whether to send all the sensing data directly to the cloud
(i.e., direct transmission), or to preprocess such data at the network edge and only
send necessary data to the cloud (i.e., preprocessing at the edge). Anomaly detec-
tion is particularly useful as an edge mining technique to reduce the transmission
iv
overhead in such a context when the frequently monitored activities contain only
a sparse set of anomalies. This paper analyzes the potential overhead-savings of
machine learning based anomaly detection models on the edge in three different
IoT scenarios. Our experimental results prove that by choosing the appropriate
anomaly detection models, we are able to effectively reduce the total amount of
transmission energy as well as minimize required cloud storage. We prove that
Random Forest, Multilayer Perceptron, and Discriminant Analysis models can vi-
ably save time and energy on the edge device during data transmission. K-Nearest
Neighbors, although reliable in terms of prediction accuracy, demands exorbitant
overhead and results in net time and energy loss on the edge device. In addition
to presenting our model results for the different IoT scenarios, we provide guide-
lines for potential model selections through analysis of involved tradeoffs such as
training overhead, prediction overhead, and classification accuracy.
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The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to a network of billions of interconnected de-
vices that have the ability to communicate and exchange data over the Internet.
Such IoT devices range from sensors, smart phones, computers, vehicles, building
appliances, and health devices. The extension of Internet connectivity to physical
devices and everyday objects has substantially increased worldwide real-time data
collection and transmission. As of 2019, there are approximately 9 billion IoT
devices across the world and by 2020 this number will surge to over 25 billion
[1]. As IoT devices and networks grow in number, the tremendous amount of
data transfer leads to concerns over both device authentication overhead as well
as data transmission overhead. In the first section, we detail our motivation and
contribution with regard to managing TLS protocol overhead during client-host
authentication in IoT networks. In the second section, we detail our motivation
and contribution with regard to deploying machine learning based anomaly detec-
tion algorithms for lowering data transmission overhead as well as cloud storage
requirements.
1
1.1 Transport Layer Security Protocol Overhead
Management
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is designed to provide encryption, au-
thentication and data integrity for communicating information over the Internet.
The TLS protocol is composed of two main phases [2]: The first phase is the
handshake, which allows a client and a server to agree on TLS version and a set of
cryptographic algorithms (ciphers). This enables the two communicating parties
to ultimately establish a shared session key. The client and server also have the op-
tion to authenticate each other using certificates provided by a trusted third-party
[3]. The second phase of the protocol is the record layer, in which the shared ses-
sion key is used to send encrypted messages between two nodes. As of today, TLS
is the most widely used protocol for securing communication between IoT devices
[4, 5]. This protocol is considered to be highly effective because of its use of public
key exchange and symmetric key (session key) encryption. Unfortunately, these
advantages come at the cost of high computational and energy demands [6, 7].
Reducing the overhead of TLS protocol is critical for multiple reasons [8, 7, 9].
First, as IoT devices are increasing by the billions, a few milli-joules saved from
each run of TLS can save millions of dollars in the big picture. Second, all networks
are vulnerable to interference, timeouts and loss of connectivity; therefore, the
overhead of the TLS protocol should not deter users from re-establishing lost
connections between nodes. Third, understanding the overhead of TLS enables
IoT designers to configure this protocol based on application requirements. For
instance, a user may intend to establish a very short-lived connection for brief
information transfer between two nodes. In this case, the user may decide to use a
lighter cipher (possibly compromising some aspects of security) in the interest of
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quickly transmitting the data. Furthermore, the use of a light cipher suite might be
justified based on the limited resources of IoT devices and to minimize the impact
of security on energy consumption. Although there are several studies on the
implementation and adoption of TLS on general purpose processing platforms and
mobile devices [10, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13], unfortunately, analyzing the computation and
energy cost of TLS on resource-constrained IoT devices has not received enough
attention from the research community.





To this end, an IoT device communicates with a server through establishing TLS
connection over an 802.11 link. We have modified the TLS code of the IoT device
to measure the processing time and energy consumption of each step of the TLS
handshake using a logic analyzer and an energy measurement tool. Our results
show that ECDHE ciphers are considerably more efficient than DHE ciphers. We
also conclude that an ECDHE cipher has lower resource consumption when using
RSA encryption as opposed to ECDSA encryption. This is attributed to the fact
that ECDSA certificate verification is a longer process. The results reported in this
work help IoT designers choose TLS cipher suite based on application demands as
well as the computational capabilities and energy resources of IoT devices.
3
1.2 Data Transmission Overhead Reduction us-
ing Anomaly Detection Edge Mining
As IoT devices grow in number, the tremendous amount of sensing data col-
lected has raised great challenges for data transmission overhead (time and en-
ergy) and cloud storage. Applications of cost-cutting edge mining techniques to
reduce packet transmission and remote storage requirements are rapidly growing
throughout IoT networks [14], [15]. One of the most basic edge mining techniques
is random sampling to reduce the number of observations sent to the cloud. More
sophisticated methods, such as anomaly detection, isolate and transmit only the
contextually relevant observations [16]. The guiding principle behind anomaly de-
tection is that only unexpected behavior needs to be notified to the centralized
cloud. Contemporary works specify different anomaly detection methods ranging
from basic thresholding to machine learning algorithms [17], [18]. However, as
the resources available at each IoT edge device can be rather limited in terms of
power, memory, connectivity, bandwidth, and computation, it is critical to choose
appropriate anomaly detection algorithms that can not only effectively identify
abnormal behaviors but also consume limited resources at the edge devices.
In this work we present supervised machine learning based anomaly detection
that can substantially reduce energy consumption and transmission overhead on
the edge and storage requirements on the cloud. We conduct our experiments on a
custom testbed inclusive of an edge device, the cloud, and an energy measurement
platform. Four classes of machine learning algorithms, Random Forest Classi-
fier (RF), Multilayer Perceptron Classifier (MLP), K-Nearest Neighbor Classifier
(KNN), and Discriminant Analysis Classifier (DA) are benchmarked on a Rasp-
berry Pi 3 (RPi3) edge device for different anomaly detection scenarios. We use
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both Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Quadratic Discriminant Analysis
(QDA) variants of DA for this study. Our work makes several novel contributions
to anomaly detection used in the context of edge mining. First, we benchmark
training and prediction phase overhead (i.e., time and energy consumption) at the
edge device for each model on multiple datasets. Second, real data rather than
synthetic data have been adopted for experiments. Third, we demonstrate tangi-
ble transmission cost-savings using machine learning based anomaly detection for
multiple datasets.
We demonstrate significant overhead-savings achieved using MLP, RF, and
DA anomaly detection model classes during the data processing and transmission
period. Furthermore, we identify the best anomaly detection model for different
application scenarios. For example, MLP features one of the shortest prediction
phases, which is recommended for time-sensitive scenarios. However, it also has
one of the most costly training phases which is undesirable if there are resource
constraints for training. By analyzing these tradeoffs, we better understand why




This chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, we present related work
for our first contribution pertaining to TLS overhead management in IoT sce-
narios. These works generally present varying benchmarking procedures for the
TLS protocol (i.e., different hardware platforms and/or different protocol phases
measured). In the second section, we present related work for our second contri-
bution pertaining to anomaly detection edge mining. These works focus primarily
on different applications of anomaly detection in IoT scenarios. Generally, each
work uses a different anomaly detection algorithm(s), different dataset(s), and/or
different testbed architecture(s).
2.1 Energy and Processing Demand Analysis of
TLS Protocol in Internet of Things Applica-
tions
In [19] and [9], the overhead of the TLS protocol is measured for hand-held mobile
devices. The authors in [19] examine the overhead of TLS for 1 MB file transfer on
a handheld HP (Compaq) iPAQ H3630 device with a 206 MHz StrongARM pro-
cessor and 32MB RAM (16MB ROM) over a Wi-Fi access point communication
link. The authors use Microsoft cyrptographic library’s implementation of TLS
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opposed to our mbedTLS implementation. This study benchmarks the protocol
using 1024 and 2048 bit RSA keys and shows time consumption of signature veri-
fication. However, it does not present any quantitative energy consumption values
nor considers individual steps of the TLS handshake. Another study examines
the overhead of TLS during a data transfer scenario between a Symbian Nokia 95
and several popular web services over both WLAN and 3G [9]. Miranda et. al [9]
present energy consumption results of this protocol with different data buffer size
configurations and indicate that the handshake phase is generally more expensive
over 3G. Furthermore, they conduct their analysis using 4 different ciphers which
is greater than most other related works.
Potlapally et al. [10] conduct a very comprehensive study on the overhead
of cryptographic algorithms both in and out of the context of the TLS protocol.
Potlapally’s study benchmarks the the energy cost of digital signature algorithms
(RSA, DSA, ECDSA) and key exchange algorithms (DH, ECDH) with various key
sizes. Furthermore, the study concludes that when there is no client authentica-
tion, an RSA handshake is more efficient than an ECC handshake and vice-versa.
Akshay et al. [20] benchmark the TLS protocol using two 2012 Nexus 7 Android
tablets with an Nvidia Tegra 3 SoC, 1 GB of RAM, and 4326 mAh batteries. The
study presents charts showing how the TLS depletes battery life by nearly 15% for
just a 1 MB download over HTTPS. In this way, the work demonstrates a clear
connection to a resource constrained IoT scenario.
Authors Koschuch et al. [21] present the overhead of different operations
within TLS using processing cycle count rather than energy metrics. They com-
pare the cycle counts for digital signature algorithm, RSA, and key exchange
algorithm, ECDSA, between a one-way authentication context and two-way au-
thentication context. They conclude that Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
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is considerably more efficient than its RSA/DSA counterparts for resource con-
strained devices because of smaller memory requirements.
2.2 Edge Mining on IoT Devices using Anomaly
Detection
Anomaly detection is one of the the most popular edge mining techniques explored
in IoT scenarios [22], [23]. In [24], [25], [26], and [27] anomaly detection is used
as a method to implement an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for Wireless Sen-
sor Networks (WSN). Sommer et al. [26] propose the use of LDA to reduce the
dimensionality of network intrusion datasets and applies both Naive Bayes and
KNN algorithms for anomaly classification. In [27], the authors benchmark the
performance of anomaly detection (i.e., false positive rates) using an unsupervised
outlier detection technique based on the RF algorithm. Furthermore, [28] demon-
strates the effectiveness of autoencoders for an unsupervised IDS and proposes a
novel splitting and learning mechanism to lower false positive detection. Although
these works explore novel applications of anomaly detection on the IoT edge, they
do not focus on resource constrained scenarios and therefore do not delve into the
time and energy consumption of these methods.
In [29], [30], and [31] anomaly detection is investigated in healthcare applica-
tions. Arijit et. al [30] propose cardiac anomaly detection with low false negative
counts and stress the importance of capturing outliers in healthcare applications.
Similar to the IDS studies, this work focuses extensively on anomaly detection
implementation but does not consider the factor of resource consumption. Sev-
eral works also tackle anomaly detection in IoT applications outside of IDS and
8
healthcare. In [32] non-machine learning anomaly detection algorithms are pro-
posed for a set of heterogenous sensors in an IoT WSN. In [33] an autoencoder
neural network is used for determining anomaly readings from a testbed of eight
temperature and humidity sensors. These works also, however, do not consider
overhead nor consider pros and cons using different anomaly detection methods.
Few works consider resource constrained IoT scenarios. For example, Sedjel-
maci et. al [34] test a reputation model based on game theory to predict attack
signatures on a resource constrained IoT device. In addition to this, the work
of Lyu et. al [35] is one of the few works which presents cost-savings poten-
tial of anomaly detection using both real and synthetic datasets on a resource
constrained IoT platform. However, this work only evaluates unsupervised hyper-
ellipsoidal clustering and does not include supervised machine learning algorithms.
Unsupervised methods are useful in the absence of ground-truth information but
are generally not as accurate as supervised methods for classification tasks.
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Chapter 3
Energy and Processing Demand
Analysis of TLS Protocol in
Internet of Things Applications
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol provides encryption, authentication and
data integrity between two communicating parties over the Internet. The TLS
protocol consists of two phases. The handshake phase allows a client and a server
to agree on TLS version and a set of cryptographic algorithms (ciphers). This
enables the two communicating parties to ultimately establish a shared session
key. The record phase follows in which the shared session key is used to send
encrypted messages between two nodes. In this study we focus on choosing a
lightweight cipher suite for the handshake phase to minimize the overhead of the
TLS protocol as a whole. Reducing the overhead of TLS protocol is paramount
for many IoT devices given that they may be resource constrained and battery-
powered. Ironically, overhead management of the TLS protocol has not been very
thoroughly examined given that TLS is the de facto authentication protocol for
IoT devices. In this study, we analyze the performance of TLS protocol using C1,
C2, and C3. We hope that these results help IoT specialists who are seeking to
speed up device authentication within their IoT networks.
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3.1 Transport Layer Security (TLS)
The TLS protocol specifies a well-defined handshake that consists of 15 steps.
Before delving into the details of each step, we provide a high level overview of
the protocol first. In the beginning of the handshake phase, hello messages are
exchanged between client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm and to
exchange random values. Then, depending upon the cipher chosen, the client and
server exchange the corresponding cryptographic parameters to agree on a pre-
master secret. Afterwards, the client authenticates the server using a pre-installed
certificate from a trusted third-party; the server may optionally authenticate the
client as well. Finally, a master secret is generated from the pre-master secret and
the random values. The session (symmetric) key is derived from the master secret
and is used to encrypt subsequent data exchange between the client and server in
the record layer phase [36]. We present each step in detail as follows:
1. client_hello. The client sends this message to the server to establish an
initial contact. This message, in particular, contains: (i) the TLS version
that the client intends to use, (ii) a list of cipher suites supported by the
client, (iii) a random number, (iv) compression method, and (v) a session id.
The server then checks its compatibility with the specified version of TLS
and the list of ciphers specified in the message.
2. server_hello. If the server’s TLS version and supported cipher suites are
compatible with that of the client, this message is sent by the server in
response to the client’s hello message. This marks the completion of a suc-
cessful negotiation.
3. server_certificate. The server sends to the client a certificate contain-
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ing its public key. The client can authenticate the server by comparing the
certificate it receives from the server to its pre-installed certificate. An au-
thentication failure is raised in the case that the server’s certificate does not
match any of the certificates pre-installed in the client.
4. server_key_exchange. In this message, the server exchanges Diffie-Hellman
cryptographic parameters (modulus, generator, newly-generated public key)
with the client so that it can convey a pre-master secret. The resource con-
sumption of this step can be attributed to the client verifying the signature
of these parameters.
5. certificate_request. This message is sent by the server to request a
certificate from the client in the case that the user has configured the server
to require client authentication. In our study, the server sends a request to
the client to adhere to the protocol, however, the server does not functionally
verify the client.
6. server_hello_done. This message is sent by the server to indicate the end
of the hello message exchange sequence. While this message is prepared and
sent, the client is verifying the validity of server’s certificate.
7. client_certificate. This message is sent by the client if the server has
requested the client to send its certificate. Even if the client does not have
a suitable certificate, it must send a certificate message that does not con-
tain any certificate. In this paper, since the client sends a blank certificate
message, this step is one of the fastest to execute.
8. client_key_exchange. In this step, the client sends its Diffie-Hellman pub-
lic key to the server.
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9. certificate_verify. This message is sent by the server to indicate that it
has successfully verified the client’s certificate. A digitally signed structure
of all the handshake messages sent or received is included in this message.
10. client_change_cipher_spec. This message is sent by client to inform the
server that subsequent data transfer will be protected by the newly negoti-
ated ciphers.
11. client_finished. This message verifies that the client has successfully
completed the authentication processes and key exchange.
12. server_change_cipher_spec. The server sends this message to notify the
client that subsequent data transfer will be protected by the newly negotiated
cipher and keys. The client then reacts by setting the session key parameters
accordingly.
13. server_finished. This message verifies that the server has successfully
completed the authentication processes and the key exchange.
14. flush_buffers. In this step, the temporary data that is a byproduct of the
handshake process is deleted on both the client and server nodes.
15. handshake_over. This message marks the completion of the handshake
phase and the start of the record layer phase.
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has named over 300 cipher
suites compatible with TLS in early 2016. BSI, a federal IT security agency
in Germany, recommends using only 16 of those ciphers for TLS [3]. Based on
recommendation, in this paper, we study the performance of the TLS protocol
using three of these ciphers. All ciphers share the following naming convention:
13
KeyExchange, CryptographicAlgorithm, ”WITH”, SessionKey and SignatureType
(each section separated by an underscore), as follows:
– C1: DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256. This cipher uses DHE key ex-
change and RSA encryption with an AES256 session key and SHA256 hash
function. SHA256 is the highest bit hash function compatible with DHE RSA
for mbed TLS [37].
– C2: ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384. This cipher uses ECDHE key
exchange and RSA encryption with an AES256 session key and SHA384 hash
function.
– C3: ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384. This cipher uses ECDHE
key exchange and ECDSA encryption with an AES256 session key and
SHA384 hash function.
Note that all three ciphers use the same session key, AES 256 CBC. AES is
a symmetric key block cipher algorithm that is used to protect information [38].
It is proven to be a highly reliable cipher and consists of three block ciphers:
AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256. Using CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) with AES
ensures that each block decryption is contingent upon the previous one. This
measure improves the security of AES block ciphers larger than 256 bits. In
our study, AES-256 is used to encrypt and decrypt all information transfer in
the record layer phase of the protocol. Hash functions SHA256 and SHA384 are
used to create digital signatures of the data. As a one-way function, SHA easily
authenticates messages while securing their content. There are other variations
for SHA (i.e., SHA224 and SHA512), but they are not available for use in mbed
TLS because they do not offer added security or efficiency.
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We have kept the session key and hash function consistent among all the
ciphers so that differences in resource consumption can be conclusively attributed
to either the key exchange method or choice of encryption algorithm. The two
key exchange methods used in this list of ciphers are DHE and ECDHE. DHE
uses modular arithmetic to compute the shared secret. In contrast, ECDHE uses
elliptic curves to generate the secret, thereby, ECDHE is considerably more effi-
cient than DHE. It is clear that the key exchange method selected significantly
impacts the resource consumption of Step 8 of the handshake, which takes care of
pre-master secret generation. Aside from the key exchange method, our ciphers
make use of two public key encryption schemes, i.e., RSA and ECDSA. ECDSA
signatures tend to be much smaller than RSA signatures given the same method
of exchange. However, RSA signature verification tends to be much faster than
ECDSA verification [10].
3.2 Experimental Procedure
We run the TLS protocol using a Cypress CYW43907 IoT device as a client and
a Raspberry Pi as a server. CYW43907 is an embedded wireless system-on-a-chip
(SoC) that features an ARM Cortex-R4 32-bit RISC processor [39, 40]. The Cy-
press IoT device supports the WICED Development Platform which offers SDKs
for system development. The TLS code used on the client and server is derived
from the mbed TLS implementation [37]. Note that we measure TLS resource
consumption on the client side.
For measuring the energy consumption of the TLS protocol we use EMPIOT
(Energy Measurement Platform for IoT Devices) [41], that is connected to the
client. The EMPIOT platform is composed of a shield installed on top of a Rasp-
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berry Pi. We measure processing time using a logic analyzer. Figure 3.1 shows our
experimental setup for time and power measurement. The client connects with
the access point through an 802.11 link. When performing TLS handshaking,
message exchange intervals can be relatively large and are heavily influenced by
network conditions. In order to ignore the overhead of message exchange, we have
modified the mbed TLS code to toggle pins on the client right before and after
the processing duration of each step. A logic analyzer that is connected to these
pins is used to measure the computation duration of each step.
The energy measurement platform, EMPIOT, is connected to the client as
follows. First, the EMPIOT powers the client via a USB connection and measures
the bus voltage and current drawn by the client. Second, the tool detects the start
and finish of each step of the handshake by connecting to four pins toggled by
the client. In other words, the EMPIOT software performs energy measurement
based on the triggers received from the client. We measure the computation and
energy demand of TLS’s step 3, 4, 8, and 9, which are all longer than 1ms. We
have observed that the processing time and energy consumption of the remaining
steps are negligible and therefore these steps will not factor into our study.
The TLS handshake may occasionally fail due to network timeout caused by
packet loss over the wireless link. To ensure the accuracy of our measurements
is not affected by these error cases, we configure the client to notify EMPIOT if
the handshake is failed. In this way, we can discard measurements collected from
incomplete runs. The detail of the power measurement process is shown in Figure
3.2. Our data collection procedure is as follows: We perform 1000 iterations of
successful TLS handshakes for each cipher, i.e., C1, C2, C3. We measure the
computation time and energy of the steps mentioned earlier for each iteration.






















Figure 3.1: The components and interconnection of the testbed used.
suites. Figure 3.4 shows the power consumption in Joules per TLS step for each
cipher. Each marker is the median of 1000 iterations, and error bars show the
higher and lower quartiles. The value on top of each error bar is the median of
the result.
Analyzing Step 3. In Step 3 the server sends to the client a certificate with
its public key and the client verifies this certificate. The results obtained from this
step indicate that C3 has considerably higher values for both processing time and
energy consumption compared to both C1 and C2. Specifically, client verification
of an ECDSA certificate is heavier than client verification of an RSA certificate.
This is a trend that has been generally identified and our results corroborate this
trend.
Analyzing Step 4. Similar to Step 3, C3 has considerably higher values

































Figure 3.2: The flow diagram of measurement methodology.
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verification is more demanding when using ECDHE ECDSA compared to the other
ciphers.
Analyzing Step 8. C1 has considerably higher values for both processing
time and energy consumption compared to both C2 and C3. We know that DHE
key exchange is generally much heavier than ECDHE and this trend is quantita-
tively proven. Compared to all other steps, Step 8 is clearly the heaviest, which
confirms that key generation factors into most of the handshake’s computational
cost.
Analyzing Step 9. Note that our testbed does not functionally perform
client authentication. In Step 7, the client sends a blank certificate that our server
is configured to always accept. The client processes the server’s default verification
very quickly; the results indicate that C1 has the shortest processing time, while
C2 and C3 also show relatively low values.
With the exception of Step 4 for C1, the upper and lower limit of all the error
bars are very close to the median value. This indicates that the processing time
and energy consumption measurements for each cipher are consistent throughout
all the iterations. Because there are no major outlier values, the median value
accurately represents the energy consumption for each step. The cumulative time
and energy measurements show that C1 is the heaviest cipher, and C3 is heavier
than C2.
We conclude that the order of the ciphers from least to greatest energy effi-
ciency is the following: C1, C3, C2. Specifically, C1 consumes 55% more energy
than C3, and C3 consumes 150% more than C2. Clearly, the most efficient cipher
based on the results is C2 (i.e., ECDHE using RSA). However, when choosing be-
tween RSA and ECDSA encryption, there are two considerations: RSA generally
19
has heavier signatures than ECDSA, however, ECDSA requires more computa-
tion for certificate verification. Our study proves that the energy consumption of
ECDSA certificate verification considerably outweighs RSA’s energy consumption
for heavier signature generation. We plan on expanding this study by extending
our pool of ciphers, ranking the ciphers based on level of security, and including

























































































Figure 3.3: Processing time of various steps. This figure confirms that client verifi-
cation of an ECDSA certificate requires about 5200% longer processing compared
to RSA. In addition, signature verification using ECDSA is around 2000% longer
than RSA. Furthermore, key exchange using DHE shows 300% longer processing
time than using ECDHE. In general, the processing overhead of C1 and C3 are


















































































Figure 3.4: This figure confirms that client verification of an ECDSA certificate
requires about 3900% more energy compared to RSA. In addition, signature verifi-
cation using ECDSA requires around 1700% more energy verus RSA. Furthermore,
key exchange using DHE shows 300% more energy compared with ECDHE. In gen-




Edge Mining on IoT Devices
using Anomaly Detection
In this chapter, we investigate the use of supervised machine learning based
anomaly detection to reduce data transmission overhead on the edge and storage
requirements on the cloud. We benchmark four classical machine learning algo-
rithm classifiers, RF, MLP, KNN, and DA (i.e. LDA/QDA) on a RPi3 edge device
for three different IoT scenarios (i.e., datasets). We show tangible data transmis-
sion overhead savings when using MLP, RF, LDA, and QDA models across all
scenarios. In addition to this we use real data as opposed to synthetic data to
corroborate the predictive accuracy of the models. Furthermore, we analyze the
tradeoffs involved in model selection for different use cases and provide expla-
nations for why the models achieve different levels of performance in different
scenarios.
4.1 Anomaly Detection Models and Datasets Used
In this section below, we provide an analysis of each machine learning method
benchmarked in our study and discuss their general use cases, time complexity,
and performance tradeoffs involved in their training and prediction phases. We
have chosen RF, MLP, KNN, LDA, and QDA (i.e., two variants of DA) for this
study because they are among the most popular machine learning classification
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Table 4.1: Mathematical notations and symbols.
d Number of features
h Number of neurons per hidden layer
i Number of iterations
k Number of hidden layers
K Number of neighbors
M Number of testing samples
N Number of training samples
o Number of output neurons
P Distance-metric complexity
T Number of trees
Classifier Training Complexity Testing Complexity
RF O(N ∗
√




if N >d: O(Nd2)
if d >N : O(d3)
O(M)
QDA O(d4) O(M logM)
Table 4.2: Training and prediction time complexity of anomaly detection models.
methods [42]. Furthermore, all chosen models have distinct underlying mathe-
matical mechanisms which account for varying model performance across different
scenarios. Table 4.1 denotes all mathematical notations. Table 4.2 provides each
model’s theoretical training and testing time complexity.
4.1.1 Random Forests
RF models are applicable to a wide range of classification problems [42]. In a
random forest, each node is split using a subset of features randomly chosen at
that node. This strategy is robust against overfitting and enables RF to perform
better than many other classifiers, including discriminant analysis, support vector
machines, and neural networks [42]. The only major downside of RF is that a large
number of trees can slow down the algorithm for real-time predictions. Suppose
there are T randomized trees, d features, and N training samples, RF’s training
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Dataset Dimensionality % of Anomalies Anomaly Type IoT Scenario
KDDCup 567497x3 0.35% Attack Detected on Network Intrusion Detection
Digits 30000x784 11% Digit 0 Anomalous Image Detection
Gestures 11674x64 25.3% A Hand Contraction of Patient Health Monitoring
Table 4.3: Overview of the datasets.
time complexity is O(N2
√
dT ) [43]. The computational complexity at test time
for a RF with T trees and d features is O(Td) [43].
4.1.2 Multilayer Perceptron
MLP is the most known and frequently used type of neural network using the
backpropagation training algorithm. In recent years, neural networks have been
extensively used for pattern recognition and optimization. MLP models contain
three types of layers: input layer, output layer, and hidden layer. Each node in
the input layer, from top to bottom, passes an input data point to each neuron in
the first hidden layer. Then, each hidden layer neuron multiplies each value with
a weight vector and computes the sum of the multiplied values. Subsequently
each hidden layer neuron applies its activation function to this sum, and sends
the resulting value to the next layer and eventually to the output layer. Suppose
there are N training samples, d features, k hidden layers each containing h neu-
rons, o output neurons, and i iterations. The time complexity of MLP training is
O(Ndhkoi) [44]. It is advisable to start with a small number of hidden layers and
nodes given the high time complexity of MLP’s backpropagation algorithm and
time-consuming grid search procedure [44]. One of the most notable advantages
of MLP, is its low prediction complexity, O(Nhk), which makes it suitable for
time-sensitive anomaly detection tasks.
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4.1.3 K-Nearest Neighbors
K-Nearest Neighbor Classifier (KNN) is a relatively simple learning algorithm. It
is very commonly used in text mining, agricultural predictions, and stock market
forecasting [45]. Because KNN does not make any assumptions about the under-
lying data distribution, it is particularly suitable for applications with little or no
prior knowledge about the distribution of the dataset. Each data point injected
into the model is classified as part of the class containing the majority of its K
nearest neighbors. We may find the nearest neighbors using various metrics such
as Euclidian distance, k-d tree, ball tree, or other user defined metrics [46].
KNNs are generally reputed for high prediction accuracy with respect to
precision and recall. Furthermore, the training phase of KNN classifiers is very
efficient. The training time complexity of KNN is only O(1). Nevertheless, there
are several drawbacks of KNNs. First, the model has high space complexity as
it stores all training data instances. Second, finding the most optimal value for
K is not trivial [47]. KNN’s most significant drawback, however, is its exorbitant
prediction phase overhead, which is O(NPMlogK) with N training samples, M
test samples, K neighbors, and P distance metric time complexity. The high
overhead at the prediction phase may make it less suitable to be carried on by
resource constrained IoT edge devices.
4.1.4 Discriminant Analysis
In this work, we use both LDA and QDA. LDA first projects a dataset onto lower-
dimensional space to prevent overfitting and to generate linear class-separability.
QDA also performs dimensionality reduction but generates a quadratic line to fit
the training data. [48]. Despite its potential for non-linear data patterns, the
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Table 4.4: Training and prediction data dimensions.
number of the parameters needed by QDA scales quadratically with that of the
variables, making it slower for very high dimensional datasets. Both LDA and
QDA are extensively used for bankruptcy status classification and face classifica-
tion. LDA’s training complexity is O(d3) if d >N (i.e., more features than training
samples) and O(Nd2) if N <d (i.e., more training samples than features). QDA’s
training complexity is generally O(d4) [48]. LDA’s prediction complexity is O(N)
whereas QDA’s prediction complexity is O(N2).
4.1.5 Datasets Used
In this paper, we benchmark all four classes of classification algorithms on the fol-
lowing datasets: KDDCup 1999 (KDDCup) [49], Digits 0-9 (Digits) [50], and Hand
Gestures (Gestures) [51]. We have chosen these datasets for the following reasons.
First, they represent different application scenarios. Second, they represent differ-
ent percentages of anomalies at 0.35%, 10%, and 25.3% respectively. Third, they
represent different orders of dimensionality at 3, 784, and 64 respectively. Table
4.3 provides an overview of each dataset with regard to anomaly detection sce-
nario, percentage of anomalies, and dimensionality. The original KDDCup dataset
from UCI machine learning repository contains 41 attributes. ODDS Library from
Stonybrook University, New York has reduced the dataset to 3 attributes: duration
of communication, number of incoming bytes, and number of outgoing bytes. Each
training sample contains 3 features and an output value indicating whether the
network is in a secure or compromised state. The original data set has 3,925,651
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attacks (80.1%) out of 4,898,431 records. ODDS has forged this dataset to contain
only 3,377 attacks (0.35%) out of 567,497 records. The end goal in this scenario
is to only notify the cloud of the sparsely occurring attacks on the network.
Digits is a dataset containing images (28×28) of digits between 0-9. There are
a total of 784 features with each feature corresponding to each constituent pixel of
a given image. Digit 0 is considered the anomalous class and constitutes roughly
10% of the dataset. We consider digit 0 to represent an unexpected entity or
intruder captured within a collection of image frames in a video stream. Anomaly
detection can substantially lower transmission overhead when filtration is applied
to high dimensional data such as images.
Hand Gestures is a dataset with 64 total attributes each representing sensor
measurements of a person’s hand while playing the game of rock-paper-scissors.
The original dataset classifies each observed motion as either rock (closed fist),
paper (open fist), scissors (two fingers pointed), and neutral (flat hand). For our
study, we designate rock as the anomalous gesture and group the other three
gestures into the norm class. We consider the rock symbol to be emblematic of a
patient’s hand contraction which requires medical assistance. In this process, we
introduce a scenario where 25.3% of the closed fist instances (i.e., anomalies) are
representative of a health condition requiring notification to the cloud.
4.2 Experimentation and Analysis
The organization of this section is as follows. First, we specify our testbed, model
creation process, and model benchmarking process. Then, we show how each
anomaly detection model performs on each dataset (i.e., scenario) with respect to
both overhead and anomaly detection accuracy. Furthermore, we show the best
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model for each scenario and analyze tradeoffs involved in model selection such as
training overhead, prediction overhead, and prediction accuracy.
4.2.1 Methodology
The testbed includes three RPi3s, which are used as the edge device, the cloud, and
the interface to connect to our energy measurement platform, EMPIOT [52]. All
RPi3s feature a BCM2837 SoC, a 1.2 GHZ quad-core ARM Cortex A53 processor,
and 1 GB LPDDR2-900 SDRAM and run Debian OS [53]. Both the client and
cloud RPi3s connect to an access point (i.e., router) through an 802.11 link. We
run and benchmark all machine learning algorithms for anomaly detection on the
edge RPi3. Time measurements are captured by setting timestamps in the Python
code before and after algorithm execution. Energy measurements are captured by
EMPIOT. EMPIOT is composed of a shield and is installed on top of the host
RPi3. Figure 4.1 shows our experimental setup inclusive of edge, cloud, and
EMPIOT.
We use scikit-learn implementations of RF, MLP, KNN, LDA, and QDA for
our anomaly detection experiment. There is minimal data preprocessing for the
three datasets used in this experiment because they do not contain missing column
values nor incorrect formatting. All code related to anomaly detection such as data
aggregation and model training/validation is written in Python 3.6 making use of
bcrypt, pandas, numpy, and scikit-learn libraries. For each dataset, we first tune
and validate each model by running an offline grid search (i.e., hyperparameter
tuning). We configure the grid search to rank model configurations based on
precision and recall. Note that we consider grid search to be a purely offline










Figure 4.1: The testbed used for our experiment inclusive of three RPi3s and the
EMPIOT energy measurement platform. The RPi3 hosting EMPIOT captures
energy measurements of the edge RPi3 transmitting data to the cloud RPi3.
note that grid search is not necessarily exhaustive in all scenarios because not
all models require extensive hyperparameter tuning. For example, RF generally
demonstrates high prediction accuracy on all datasets using default scikit-learn
parameters. MLP, on the other hand, requires extensive hyperparameter tuning
to converge on hidden layer and node count. Having decided on hyperparameter
configuration, we are left with one-time model training. For each scenario, we
train a model with the least number of samples that enables it to predict with
both precision and recall greater than 80% and either precision or recall greater
than 90%. Table 4.4 shows the training data size for each dataset. We choose to
benchmark model training on the RPi3 edge to provide reference for cases when
the edge needs to carry on model training. Note that we also consider model
training to be an offline operation and therefore will not factor this cost into our
overhead-savings analysis.
We benchmark model precision and recall for each dataset. Precision indi-





















































































RF MLP KNN LDA QDA
(b)
Figure 4.2: All models are viable for the datasets chosen. All models perform
best for the KDDCup dataset, containing the lowest number of features, and
post precision and recall values of 98.9% and 97.96% respectively. RF and QDA
offer the best prediction accuracy for Gestures while RF and KNN offer the best
prediction accuracy for Digits.
Recall indicates the percentage of results accurately classified by the algorithm
Recall = TruePositiveCount
TruePositiveCount+FalseNegativeCount
. We also tabulate the time and energy
consumption of each model’s training phase and prediction phase. The training
phase entails instantiating a model with a hyperparameter configuration and fit-
ting the model on training samples. The prediction phase entails executing the
model predict function on a buffer of test samples. Time is measured by setting
timers within the Python code while energy is measured using EMPIOT. All data
transmitted to the cloud is secured using 256-bit AES encryption. Note that en-
cryption overhead is factored into our cost analysis. For each model and dataset,
we show precision, recall, prediction time and energy, training time and energy,
the number of observations and MBs saved by the cloud, and lastly, the time
and energy saved using anomaly detection. We then closely analyze the quanti-



























































































RF MLP KNN LDA QDA
(b)
Figure 4.3: MLP features the most expensive training phase with RF, QDA,
LDA, and KNN generally following in this order as shown in (a) and (b). MLP
costs approximately 500% more time and 500% more energy than the next best
performing model across all datasets.
4.2.2 Results and Analysis
We present the model performance and model overhead results obtained from
each dataset. We recommend the best model for each scenario based on training
and prediction overhead and model performance. Note that the time and energy
savings reported for each anomaly detection model consider prediction cost and
not the offline training cost. We conclude this section with an analysis of general
model behavior observed across all datasets and propose recommended use cases
for each model.
KDDCup Dataset
For the 3 feature KDDCup dataset, all models are trained using 10000 network
observations out of a total of 567497 labeled training samples with 0.35% anomaly
rate. Note that this dataset has the lowest dimensionality as well as the lowest







































































































RF MLP KNN LDA QDA
(b)
Figure 4.4: LDA offers the most cost-effective prediction phase for both Digits as
well as KDDCup datasets as shown in (a) and (b). MLP offers the most cost-
effective prediction phase for the 64 feature Gestures dataset. KNN costs nearly
600% more energy and 650% more time than the next best performing model
across all datasets.
gates 50000 size network status buffers for the prediction phase (i.e., anomaly
detection) and subsequent transmission.
Figure 4.2 shows the precision and recall values observed when applying each
model for each scenario. We see that all models post exceptional precision and
recall values on the sparse anomaly KDDCup dataset. Relatively speaking, MLP
posts the lowest precision and recall values at 98.9% and 97.9% respectively. All
other models post over 99% recall and 100% precision. We subsequently examined
that one of the features in this dataset has a Gaussian distribution and that the
anomalies primarily occur when the feature’s value lied ±3σ outside of the mean.
Given this level of accuracy in anomaly detection, we assert that the edge device
can save around 99.5% of the data (i.e., approximately 1.2 MB) per buffer sent to
the cloud.
Figure 4.3 shows the training time and energy for each model applied on
different datasets. Specifically for KDDCup, LDA has the most time and energy
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efficient training phase among all models. This is because LDA uses an underly-
ing dimensionality-reduction technique for generating a class-separating boundary
that is efficiently performed on a 3 dimensional dataset. KNN, RF, and MLP
follow in order. RF takes a significantly longer time proportional to KNN for this
dataset due to the relatively large test data buffer size.
Figure 4.4 shows the prediction time and energy when each model is applied.
As shown in Figure 4, when applied on the KDDCup data, LDA is also the most
cost-effective model for prediction. The low dimensionality of inputs to the model
enables LDA to classify anomalies very efficiently. It is followed by MLP, RF, and
KNN. MLP is marginally worse than LDA for this scenario considering the fact
that it is slightly inferior in terms of prediction accuracy. RF is a well-rounded
choice with respect to both prediction accuracy and overhead. Note that RF’s
prediction overhead exceeds LDA’s prediction overhead due to the complexity
involved in processing test samples at multiple nodes at multiple tree levels. KNN
is rendered slow and ineffective for this scenario as its prediction phase consumes
nearly 38 seconds and 101J for a 50000×3 buffer.
Digits Dataset
The 784 feature Digits dataset has the highest dimensionality among all our
datasets and is emblematic of an anomalous image detection scenario. For this
dataset, all models are trained using 3000 images out of the total 20000 images
with a 10% anomaly rate. The edge device performs anomaly detection on buffers
containing 2000 images and transmits the anomalous images identified.
Regarding prediction accuracy, Figure 4.2 shows that KNN offers the best
overall precision and recall among all models at 94% and 97.4% respectively. RF
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posts the highest precision out of all the models at 97.1%. LDA performs the
poorest in this scenario offering 92.42% recall but only 83.18% precision. Given
the overall high level of accuracy in anomaly detection, we assert that the edge
device can save around 89.5% of the data (i.e., approximately 11.3 MB) per buffer
sent to the cloud.
As far as training overhead, Figure 4.3 shows that KNN has the most effi-
cient training phase on the Digits dataset. KNN only stores training samples as
part of its training phase rather than formulating a mapping between inputs and
outputs. Therefore, for this 784 dimensional dataset, the other algorithms have
a considerably more demanding training phase. KNN is followed by LDA, RF,
and MLP in order. MLP, which has the most expensive training phase, costs 168
seconds and 524.97J. This result is expected given the computationally expensive
nature of MLP’s backpropagation algorithm and high data dimensionality.
In terms of prediction overhead, Figure 4.4 shows that LDA has the most
efficient prediction phase among all models and costs only 0.11 sec and 0.3J for
prediction on a 2000 image buffer. It is followed by RF, MLP, and KNN in order.
KNN is very expensive for prediction and costs nearly 230 seconds and 600J. This
is because the distance computation between K neighbors and all M test sam-
ples is costly for 784 dimensional data points. If we prioritize prediction accuracy
much higher than prediction time, KNN offers the best precision and recall values
at the expense of costly prediction overhead. If the primary objective is to mini-
mize transmission time delay, LDA offers a robust solution at the expense of low
precision (i.e., 83.18%). RF and MLP lie in the middle ground and are the two
most well-rounded solutions for this scenario. Because RF also has significantly
less training overhead, we propose that RF is the best anomaly detection method




























































































RF MLP KNN LDA QDA
(b)
Figure 4.5: RF, MLP, and LDA all demonstrate overhead savings when applied
to data before transmission; most notably, RF applied to the Digits dataset saves
45.119 J and 16.37 seconds per 2000 image buffer. KNN is a poor choice for real-
time anomaly detection scenarios given that it causes net time and energy loss
across all datasets.
Gestures Dataset
For this 64 feature dataset, all the models are trained using 3000 hand gesture ob-
servations out of a total of 12000 hand gesture observations with a 25.3% anomaly
rate. This dataset has the second highest dimensionality and the highest anomaly
rate among all datasets. In this scenario, the edge device aggregates 3000 observa-
tions (gestures) per buffer for the prediction phase and subsequent transmission.
Note that we use QDA only on this dataset instead of LDA as LDA posted less
than 20% precision. This is because LDA could only generate a linear fit for cer-
tain features in this dataset that exhibited quadratic patterns. Nevertheless, we
benchmarked LDA and observed that it takes 0.43 seconds for the training phase
and 0.051 seconds for the prediction phase. Therefore, if LDA demonstrated ac-
ceptable prediction accuracy for Gestures, it would have claimed the second most
efficient training phase and the most efficient prediction phase among all models.






































































































RF MLP KNN LDA QDA
(b)
Figure 4.6: From (a) we observe that the models reduce approximately 90% of the
observations sent from Digits’ buffers, 76% of the observations sent from Gestures’
buffers, and 99.5% of the observations sent from KDDCup’s buffers. The resulting
saved cloud storage shown in (b) is substantial, especially for Digits dataset where
we saved nearly 12 MB of data sent per 2000 image buffer.
highest recall out of all models at 98.2%. RF also performs well with 93.03%
recall and 93.97% precision. It is followed by MLP and KNN in order. Given the
overall high level of accuracy in anomaly detection, we assert that the edge device
can save around 75% of the data (i.e., approximately 1.15 MB) per buffer sent to
the cloud.
KNN training, as shown in Figure 4.3, is the most efficient and MLP training
is the least efficient. RF training costs substantially more overhead than QDA.
This is explained by the computation involved in creating a set of randomized
decision trees for a pool of 64 features.
As far as prediction overhead, MLP has the most efficient prediction phase
for the Gestures dataset and consumes 0.054 seconds and 0.142J per buffer. This
is 274% more time efficient and 294% more energy efficient than the next best RF
prediction phase. QDA and KNN follow in order. MLP is the clear choice for this
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scenario because it offers fast anomaly detection and the best cost-savings among
all four models.
General Observations
We note that time and energy savings for each anomaly detection model is calcu-
lated by subtracting both prediction phase overhead and anomalous buffer trans-
mission overhead from full buffer transmission overhead. Figure 4.5 shows the
overhead savings observed when applying each model on each dataset. LDA pro-
vides the most data transmission overhead savings among all models. MLP, QDA,
RF, and KNN follow in order. Considering that the deployment of KNN leads
to net overhead loss across all benchmarked scenarios, its use may be eliminated
from real-time anomaly detection scenarios.
Comparing both Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.4, we note that the rank ordering
of models’ overhead savings from least to greatest matches the rank ordering of
models’ prediction phase overhead from greatest to least. From Figure 4.4, note
that QDA, which is used in place of LDA for the Gestures dataset, substantially
exceeds LDA in prediction phase overhead consumption. This explains why MLP
has the fastest prediction phase for the Gestures dataset but has the second and
third slowest prediction phase for KDDCup and Digits datasets respectively. Also
note that RF has the second most efficient prediction phase for Digits but is sub-
stantially less efficient than MLP for KDDCup. This suggests that RFs are more
sensitive to testing buffer size than dimensionality. For reference purposes, the
rank ordering of training time complexity from greatest to least is generally MLP,
RF, QDA, LDA, and KNN across all datasets. Note that all rankings presented are
based on testing with Python’s scikit-learn library and experimental results may
vary when using other software implementations of the machine learning models.
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Figure 4.6 shows percentages of buffer size reduction and fewer MBs of data
sent to the cloud upon applying each model on each dataset. The amount of
data storage conserved on the cloud depends on the dateset’s anomaly rate and
dimensionality. Low anomaly rate indicates that there will be a proportionally
smaller number of observations sent to the cloud. Low dimensionality indicates
that there will be fewer bytes of data per observation sent to the cloud. The cloud
would benefit the most when applying anomaly detection for a scenario with very
high dimensional data and low anomaly detection rate. In this way, the cloud
will not receive the vast majority of data points sent from the edge. With this
in mind, we will examine the cloud storage savings observed for each discussed
scenario. KDDCup has the lowest dimensionality (i.e., 3) and lowest anomaly rate
(i.e., 0.35%) among all the datasets. Therefore, we are able to filter over 99% of
the observations captured on the edge but save only 3 features per observation.
This explains why we are only able to save approximately 1.2 MB sent to the
cloud during prediction phase even though the buffer size is 50000. Digits has
the highest dimensionality (i.e., 784) among all datasets and falls between the
other two datasets with regard to anomaly rate (i.e., 10%). Despite having a
considerably higher anomaly rate than KDDCup, Digit’s dimensionality ensures
that we save 784 data points sent to the cloud per observation. Thus, by filtering
90% of each Digits buffer we save roughly 12.3 MB sent to the cloud. Lastly,
Gestures has the highest anomaly detection rate (i.e., 25.3%) and ranks second as
far as dimensionality (i.e., 64). This indicates that there is a substantially higher
proportion of observations needed to be notified to the cloud compared to the other
scenarios and a moderate level of data points saved per filtered observation. These
two factors slightly downgrade cloud storage savings and result in approximately
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Both studies in this thesis offer ways to reduce resource consumption of IoT de-
vices. In Energy and Processing Demand Analysis of TLS Protocol in Internet of
Things Applications, we benchmark three different ciphers and present the most
lightweight configuration when running the TLS handshake. Every fraction of
time and energy saved per TLS handshake pays enormous dividends in the long
run considering that TLS authentication is utilized by many billions of IoT devices
worldwide. In Edge Mining on IoT Devices using Anomaly Detection, we propose
using supervised machine learning anomaly detection techniques to considerably
reduce data sent to the cloud. This can considerably reduce edge device data
transmission overhead costs as well as cloud storage requirements.
In our TLS benchmarking study, we conclude that the order of the ciphers
from least to greatest energy efficiency is the following: C1, C3, C2. Specifically,
C1 consumes 55% more energy than C3, and C3 consumes 150% more than C2.
Clearly, the most efficient cipher based on the results is C2 (i.e., ECDHE using
RSA). However, when choosing between RSA and ECDSA encryption, there are
two considerations: RSA generally has heavier signatures than ECDSA, however,
ECDSA requires more computation for certificate verification. Our study proves
that the energy consumption of ECDSA certificate verification considerably out-
weighs RSA’s energy consumption for heavier signature generation. We plan on
expanding this study by extending our pool of ciphers, ranking the ciphers based
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on level of security, and including network overhead, using various types of IoT
devices. For future work, we would like to benchmark TLS with additional cipher
suite configurations using multiple hardware platforms.
In our edge mining anomaly detection study, we proved that RF, MLP, LDA,
and QDA anomaly detection models have considerable potential to save edge de-
vice transmission overhead as well as cloud storage. The overhead-savings for a
generic IoT scenario varies depending upon the anomaly rate and dimensionality of
the transmitted data. We conclude that LDA has the most cost-effective anomaly
detection phase that we have benchmarked across all scenarios and should be the
primary choice for an extremely resource constrained edge device. QDA also has
a very efficient anomaly detection phase but undoubtedly demands more overhead
than LDA for the quadratic fit operation. We also conclude that RF is the most
well-rounded anomaly detection method among all models featuring a comparably
lightweight prediction phase and offering exceptional precision and recall. MLP
also works very well for time-critical prediction tasks given that there are not sig-
nificant resource constraints for training. The KNN classifier, despite its reliable
prediction accuracy, demands excessive amounts of time and energy for anomaly
detection, which rules out its use case in most IoT scenarios. The only reason
to consider using KNN is in a case of stringent resource constraints for model
training.
This work clearly demonstrates the overhead-savings potential of machine
learning based anomaly detection on both edge and cloud. We also have pro-
vided a comprehensive overview of the tradeoffs involved in the deployment of
these models. For future work, we aim to benchmark unsupervised classification
methods for anomaly detection. Unsupervised machine learning methods are very
useful when we do not have ground truth labeling but can infer properties from
42
the training dataset. For example, Elliptical Envelope is a suitable technique for a
dataset which expresses a multivariate gaussian distribution and an Isolation For-
est is optimal for a dataset which expresses a multimodal distribution. For future
contribution, we also aim to scale our experimental setup to other IoT platforms
such as Cypress CYW43907.
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